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Abstract: This paper examines the impacts of tightening environmental regulations on optimal trade and investment 
policies.  We find that for a small open two-sector economy with an importable sector relying on foreign capital while 
emitting pollution, a more stringent environmental measure leads to a higher optimal tariff and possibly a higher optimal 
tax on foreign capital.  This result holds whether or not there are capital tax credits in the foreign country.  When such tax 
credits are in place in the foreign country, three possible cases regarding the domestic capital tax rate relative to the foreign 
rate are identified and examined.  In one such case, multiple equilibria of optimal policies may exist. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
     Liberalizing trade barriers has been the single major 
item discussed during numerous rounds of trade 
negotiations over the last two decades.  Negotiations are 
particularly intense between the advanced industrialized 
nations and the developing/newly emerging countries.  A 
notable example in the arena of the North-South trade 
negotiation is the bilateral trade agreement that was 
finally reached in November 1999 between the U.S. and 
China to pave the way for China to join the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).  A key feature in the agreement is 
China's pledge to reduce industrial tariffs from 21 
percent to 17 percent and agricultural duties to 15 
percent in addition to opening the door wider to welcome 
foreign investment. 
     Almost  concomitant  with  trade  liberalization  is  the 
increasing outcry for environmental preservation 
especially in the advanced nations.  Sustainable growth 
has become a vital goal for many countries that were 
signatories of the declaration reached at the 1992 Earth 
Summit meeting held in Brazil.  It is noteworthy that 
free-trade advocates believe that trade liberalization 
promotes competition and enhances productivity leading 
to a win-win situation for all economies.  Advocates also 
claim that freer trade is conducive to environmental 
protection, as growth and higher living standards 
increase the general public's consciousness concerning 
the environment as they pursue a better quality of life. 
     In contrast to the free trade advocates, protectionists 
are concerned about the inability of firms in the 
developing countries to compete with foreign firms.   
They believe that protection is warranted from imports 
that compete with local firms.  Furthermore, they worry 
that increasingly stringent environmental regulations will 
scare away foreign investors, decreasing job opportunities 
for local workers.  Meanwhile, environmental activists 
express serious concern about marine destruction, 
widespread pollution and global warming resulting from 
trade and investment liberalization and globalization.  In 
fact, the environmentalists, regarded as a kind of veiled 
protectionists, caught the media's attention by staging 
violent street protests that disrupted recent WTO 
meetings in Seattle at the end of 1999 and in Washington 
D.C. in April, 2000. 
     Apparently, there are extensive connections between 
trade and investment policies and environmental 
regulations.  The issue of the interrelationship between 
freer trade, more international investment and better 
environment is expected to become a major topic for 
discussion and deliberation at the future WTO meetings. 
  The purpose of this paper is to make a modest 
contribution to identify possible interactions between 
trade liberalization and the environment in the presence 
or absence of tax credits.  In particular, we will examine 
the impact of tightening environmental regulations on 
optimal trade and investment policies.
1  We find that for 
a small open two-sector economy with the importable 
sector using foreign capital and emitting polution, more 
stringent environmental measures lead to a higher IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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optimal tariff and possibly a higher optimal tax on 
foreign capital.  This result may hold when tax credits on 
capital earnings are introduced in the foreign country.   
     The organization of this paper is as follows.  Section 2 
introduces a two-sector, specific-factor general 
equilibrium model for a small open, capital-importing 
economy.  The assumptions and salient features of the 
model are delineated.  The individually optimal as well 
as jointly optimal trade and investment policies in terms 
of tariff and capital tax respectively are derived and 
illustrated.  The impact of a change in environmental 
regulation on the jointly optimal trade and investment 
policies is ascertained.  The analysis in this section is 
relatively straightforward; it is conducted to set the stage 
for analyzing a set of more complex scenarios when tax 
credits become available for foreign capital in the foreign 
country.  This is done in section 3 where three possible 
cases regarding whether a domestic tax or subsidy is 
levied on foreign capital and in the former case whether 
the domestic tax rate is higher or lower than the foreign 
rate.  Multiple equilibria of optimal trade and investment 
policies are identified when a domestic subsidy is given 
to foreign capital.  Finally, concluding remarks are 
presented in section 4.        
    
 
2.  The Two-Sector, Specific Factor Model with 
Foreign Investment 
     Consider  a  small  open,  capital-importing  economy 
which produces two types of traded goods, agriculture X1 
and manufacturing X2, and a pollutant Z by using labor, 
capital and land.  While labor is intersectorally mobile, 
capital and land are sector specific.  The production 
functions of X1 and X2, respectively, are: 
     X1 = X1(L1, T),          
     X2 = X2(L2, K),       
where Li is labor employed in sector i (i = 1, 2),  T is 
land specific to X1, and K is foreign capital specific to 
X2.  Capital is mobile internationally and labor is mobile 
only domestically.  The manufacturing sector is the 
polluting industry which generates a pollutant, Z, as a 
by-product in producing X2.
2  Pollution harms consumers 
and lowers social welfare.  The home government 
therefore imposes a pollution tax at the rate, s, on the 
pollutant emitted by sector 2.
3  In addition, the home 
country also imposes a tariff on imports and a tax on 
foreign capital.   
     The home country is assumed to export good 1 and 
import good 2.  Choosing good 1 as the numeraire, the 
home price of good 2, p, is equal to the foreign price, p
*, 
plus the specific tariff rate, t.  The value of total domestic 
production can be represented by the revenue function: 
     G(1, p, s, K) = max {X1(L1, T) + pX2(L2, K) - sZ: L1 
+ L2 = L}, 
where L is the endowment of labor.  As labor (L) and 
land (T) are fixed, they are conveniently suppressed in 
the above revenue function.  The usual properties of the 
revenue function prevail; namely, Gp = X2, being the 
supply of X2, and Gs = - Z, denoting the pollution 
emission.  Note that  GK = p(?X2/?K), the value of the 
marginal product of capital, is equal to the domestic rate 
of capital return, denoted by r.  A tax at rate t is imposed 
on capital, and the net return on foreign capital is 
therefore r - t.  
     The demand side of the economy is represented by the 
aggregate expenditure function: 
     E(1, p, Z, u) = min {C1 + pC2: u(C1, C2, Z) = u}, 
where u is the social utility function and Eu > 0.  Here, Ep 
= C2, being the demand for good 2.  As pollution 
adversely affects utility, we have ?u/?Z < 0.  To maintain 
the same level of utility, more consumption on goods is 
needed for compensating the loss due to pollution, 
rendering EZ > 0.  While the sign of EpZ = ?C2/?Z is a 
priori indeterminate, we assume for concreteness that EpZ 
< 0; i.e., the consumption of good 2 decreases with an 
increase in the pollution level.
4 
     Utilizing  the  above production and demand 
information, the home economy can be succinctly 
described by the following equations: 
     E(1, p, Z, u) = G(1, p, s, K) + tM + tK + sZ - rK,    
 (1) 
     M = Ep(1, p, Z, u) - Gp(1, p, s, K),      (2) 
     Gs(1, p, s, K) = - Z,                               (3) 
     GK(1, p, s, K) - t = r
*,       (4) 
where M is the imports of good 2 and r
* is the given 
world rate of return on capital.  Equation (1) gives the 
home country's budget constraint: consumption spending 
equals revenue from production, plus import tariff 
revenue and revenues from taxing both foreign capital 
and pollution emission, minus payments to foreign 
capital.  Equations (2) and (3) define the import of good 
2 and the level of pollution emission, respectively.   
Finally, equation (4) is the equilibrium condition of the 
capital market that requires the same after-tax rate of 
returns between countries.  Here, we assume no capital 
tax in the foreign country. 
     The model of (1) to (4), consisting four unknowns, u, 
K, Z and M, and three policy instruments, t, t and s, is 
amenable for our analysis.  First, we carry out the welfare 
analysis for deriving the individual and jointly optimal 
rates of tariff and capital tax, and then we examine the 
impacts of changes in the pollution tax on optimal tariff 
and capital tax.  The welfare effects of tariffs and 
investment taxes are obtained by totally differentiating 
(1): 
     Eudu = (s - EZ)dZ + tdM + tdK.      (5) 
The first term on the right-hand side of (5) represents the 
environmental impact on welfare, depending on the 
revenue from pollution taxes relative to the cost of 
pollution to consumers.  The second and third terms are, IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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respectively, the standard volume-of-trade effect with 
respect to the imported good and capital inflow.   
Apparently, the home welfare is maximized when t = 0, t 
= 0 and EZ = s.  That is, free trade in goods and 
unrestricted international capital movement, together 
with the Pigouvian tax on pollution emissions, is the 
first-best policy for a small open, capital-importing 
economy.  However, free trade may not be optimal if the 
pollution tax is not set equal to its cost to consumers, 
with or without other types of distortions in the goods 
and factor markets.  These issues will be systematically 
analyzed below.   
     In the presence of a given pollution tax, the second-
best optimal tariff and the capital tax can be derived by 
using (5).  Substituting the change of M from (2) into (5) 
gives: 
     (Eu - tEpu)du = t(Epp - Gpp)dt + [s - (EZ - tEpZ)]dZ + (t 
- tGpK)dK - tGpsds,      (6) 
where Eu - tEpu > 0.
5  Note that the second subscripts in 
E(?) and R(?) represent the second partial derivatives.   
Here, Epp < 0 and Gpp > 0, denoting respectively the 
negative demand for and the positive supply of good 2.  
Recall that we assume EpZ < 0.  Furthermore, due to the 
existence of the specific factor, K, in the production of 
X2, we have GpK = ?X2/?K > 0 and Gps = ?X2/?s < 0, as a 
pollution tax against sector 2 dampens its production. 
 
 
A.  Optimal Capital Taxes: 
     While a tax on foreign capital impedes capital inflow, 
the capital tax in the present framework can also lower 
pollution emissions via a reduction in the output of the 
polluting sector.  The impacts of the capital tax on capital 
flows and pollution emissions are ascertained from (3) 
and (4) as: 
     dK/dt = 1/GKK < 0,                      (7) 
     dZ/dt = - GsK/GKK < 0,                        (8) 
where GKK = ?r/?K < 0 and GsK = - ?Z/?K < 0.  These 
results will be used for determining the welfare effect of a 
capital tax.  Intuitively, a rise in the tax on foreign 
capital yields both positive and negative welfare effects.  
The tax gives revenue and also reduces pollution due to 
less production.  Both events are welfare enhancing.  On 
the other hand, the higher tax lowers capital inflows, 
causing less tax revenue from pollution.  This is welfare 
reducing.  The welfare effect of a capital tax is immediate 
from (6):  
     (Eu - tEpu)(du/dt) = [s - (EZ - tEpZ)](dZ/dt) + (t - 
tGpK)(dK/dt).      (9) 
The first term on the right-hand side of (9) expresses that 
the detrimental pollution externality (EZ) can be offset by 
pollution tax revenue, while the second term indicates 
that in the presence of tariffs, the harmful welfare effect 
of an inflow of foreign capital can be mitigated by 
investment tax revenue.
6  In general, the overall welfare 
effect of capital taxes is indeterminate.  By setting du/dt 
= 0 in (9), we obtain the optimal rate of capital tax (t
o): 
     t
o = (EZ - s)(dZ/dt)/(dK/dt) + t[GpK(dK/dt) - 
EpZ(dZ/dt)]/(dK/dt).       (10) 
This states that t
o = 0 when t = 0 and EZ = s; free capital 
movement is optimal when tariff is zero and pollution tax 
is set equal to its damage to consumers.  However, for t = 
0 only, t
o can be positive or negative depending on the 
relative amounts of EZ and s.  If the cost of pollution to 
consumers, EZ, exceeds (falls short of) the benefit from 
pollution taxes, s, a positive (negative) t
o is needed to 
discourage (encourage) the inflow of foreign capital, 
which leads to more pollution emission (pollution tax 
revenue).  Furthermore, as shown in the second term of 
(10), t
o has a positive relationship with t when t ? 0.  This 
is because tariffs lower welfare due to the over expansion 
of the production of good X2.  To mitigate this 
detrimental effect, a positive capital tax is needed. 
     The relationship between t
o and t is plotted in Figure 
1 as the upward-sloping t
o schedule, where the horizontal 
intercept given by the first term on the right-hand side of 
(10) is positive (negative) when EZ > (<) s,
7 and the slope 
is shown by the second term attached to t.  Any vertical 
movements of t toward t
o will improve welfare.  This can 
be seen by substituting t
o in (10) into (7) to yield: 
     (Eu - tEpu)(du/dt) = (dK/dt)(t - t
o).           (11) 
Here, du/dt < (>) 0 when t > (<) t
o, implying that 
reducing (raising) the capital tax rate improves welfare 
when t is larger (smaller) than its optimal rate. 
  
 
B.  Optimal Tariffs 
     In contrast to the case of capital taxes, tariffs induce 
inflows of foreign capital (to bypass trade barriers) 
thereby leading to an expansion of the polluting sector X2 
and an increased level of pollution emission.  These tariff 
effects can be verified by solving (3) and (4) as 
     dK/dt = - GKp/GKK > 0,              (12) 
     dZ/dt = - Gsp - GsK(dK/dt) > 0.       (13) 
Intuitively, a tariff generates a variety of effects as 
follows: (i) more foreign capital inflow means more 
capital tax revenue and more pollution tax revenue.  Both 
are good for welfare; and (ii) overproducing the 
importable good X2, and hence less imports and higher 
pollution emission are all welfare reducing. 
          Using (12) and (13), we can identify from (6) the 
various welfare effects of changes in tariffs as 
     (Eu - tEpu)(du/dt) = t(Epp - Gpp) + [s - (EZ - 
tEpZ)](dZ/dt) + (t - tGpK)(dK/dt).   (14) 
A comparison of (14) with (9) reveals that the two 
welfare expressions are similar except for the appearance 
of the adverse volume-of-trade effect in the first term of 
(14).  Given the ambiguity in (14), the optimal tariff rate 
can be obtained by setting du/dt = 0 in (14) as 
     t
o = [(EZ - s)/A](dZ/dt) - t(dK/dt)/A,       (15) IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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where A = (Epp - Gpp) + EpZ(dZ/dt) - GpK(dK/dt) < 0 by 
assuming EpZ < 0.  Equation (15) implies that t
o = 0 
when EZ = s and t = 0.  However, for t = 0, we have t
o > 
(<) 0 when EZ < (>) s.  That is, if the cost of pollution to 
consumers falls below (exceeds) the pollution tax rate, 
the optimal tariff rate will be positive (negative).   
Furthermore, for t ? 0, the relationship between t
o and t is 
positive, plotted in Figure 1 as the t
o schedule.  The 
vertical intercept of the t
o schedule is positive (negative) 
when EZ > (<) s, and the slope is simply (dK/dt)A.  Any 
horizontal movements of t toward t
o will improve 
welfare.  This can be seen by substituting t
o in (15) into 
(12) to yield: 
     (Eu - tEpu)(du/dt) = A(t - t
o).        (16) 
This indicates that du/dt > (<) 0 when t < (>) t
o. 
 
 
C.  Joint Optimal Policies and Pollution Taxes 
     For a given pollution tax, we can solve from (10) and 
(15) the jointly optimal tariff and capital tax, t
oo and t
oo, 
as 
 
     t
oo = (EZ - s)Gsp/[EpZGsp - (Epp - Rpp)],                        
 (17) 
     t
oo = (EZ - s)[GpKGsp + (Epp - Rpp)GsK]/[EpZGsp - (Epp - 
Rpp)].       (18) 
This pair of equations yields a number of interesting 
results.  If EZ = s, free trade in goods and capital (t
oo = 0 
and t
oo = 0) is optimal for the small open, capital-
importing economy.  This is the standard result.   
However, if EZ ? s, free trade may not be optimal.   
Consider first the case that EZ < s, in which the tax 
revenue from pollution exceeds its cost to consumers.   
The expansion of the production of the polluting sector 
X2 via tariff protection (t
oo > 0) and/or a capital subsidy 
(t
oo < 0) is therefore desirable.  On the other hand, capital 
inflow may reduce welfare and hence a tax on foreign 
capital (t
oo > 0) may be needed.  These two conflicting 
forces cause t
oo in (18) to be ambiguous.  Note that the 
opposite reasoning applies to the case that EZ > s, such 
that we have t
oo < 0 and t
oo  0.  The jointly optimal tariff 
and capital tax rates, t
oo and t
oo, can be illustrated in 
Figure 1 by the intersection point of the t
o and t
o 
schedules. 
          We now turn to the effects of a change in the 
pollution tax on the jointly optimal tariff and the capital 
tax.  From (17) and (18), we obtain:  
     dt
oo/ds = - Gsp/[EpZGsp - (Epp - Rpp)] > 0,     (19) 
     dt
oo/ds = GspGKK + (Epp - Rpp)GsKGKK/GpK  0.        (20) 
That is, a higher pollution tax unambiguously raises the 
optimal tariff rate, but the pollution tax effect on the 
optimal capital tax rate is indeterminate.  This is due to 
the fact that the pollution tax on X2 raises its cost and 
thus lowers its output.  To offset this higher production 
cost effect, a rise in tariff to provide further protection to 
X2 is needed.  Alternatively, a reduction in the capital tax 
rate can help the X2 sector.  But a lower capital tax rate 
inducing more capital inflows may lower welfare, and a 
rise in capital tax can discourage the harmful inflow of 
capital.  In view of these two conflicting effects, the 
impact of a pollution tax on the capital tax in (20) 
becomes ambiguous. 
     The results in (19) and (20) are illustrated in Figure 1. 
 A rise in the pollution tax leads to rightward shifts of 
both the t
o and t
o schedules.  This means that dt
oo/ds > 0, 
but dt
oo/ds  0.  The latter depends on the relative shifts of 
the two curves.  We summarize the above results as 
follows: 
Proposition 1:  In a small open, two-sector economy 
with the importable sector emitting pollution, tightening 
environmental regulation via a pollution tax will lead to 
a higher optimal tariff.  But the effect of the pollution tax 
on the optimal capital tax is indeterminate. 
     For  a  small  developing  economy  depicted  in  this 
paper, promoting environmental preservation is 
incompatible with the goal of trade liberalization.  This 
result sheds light on the heated debates among the 
various groups and countries with varying developmental 
stages in the recent round of talks on the WTO's trade 
liberalization. 
  
 
3.  Capital Tax Credits 
     The preceding model can be expanded to consider the 
effects of an introduction of capital tax credits by the 
source country on optimal trade and investment policies 
and the impacts on these policies as environmental 
regulations alter.  In fact, the tax credit system has been 
in place in many developed and newly industrialized 
countries.  Following the pioneering work of Bond 
(1991), we assume that tax credits exist such that the 
amount of taxes paid by foreign investors to the host 
country can be deducted from the tax liability in the 
source country.  With the capital tax credit, the effective 
tax rate applicable to foreign capital becomes max(t, t
*), 
where t
* is the capital tax rate in the source country.  In 
equilibrium, the after-tax rates of returns on capital are 
the same between countries: 
     GK(1, p, s, K) - max(t, t
*) = r
* - t
*.         (21) 
Note that if the host country gives subsidies to foreign 
capital (i.e., t < 0), instead of taxes, all the subsidies 
(with repatriation of capital returns) would be captured 
by the source country.  The tax credits become irrelevant 
here and, hence, the capital-market equilibrium condition 
remains essentially as in (4): GK - t - t
* = r
* - t
*, and the 
earlier analysis without tax credits holds.   
     When  t  >  t
*, the tax credit available is t
*, and the 
capital market equilibrium in (21) is: GK - t = r
* - t
*.  
This implies that for a given t
*, the earlier results derived 
(for t
* = 0) in the absence of tax credits in section 2 hold IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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qualitatively.  Thus, we would not duplicate the analysis. 
     On the other hand, for 0 < t < t
*, we have GK(1, p, s, 
K) = r
* in (21).  From this equilibrium condition, K can 
be solved as a function of p and s, but K is not related to t 
for a given r
*.  The latter means that changes in the home 
capital tax rate will not affect the capital movement 
(dK/dt = 0) and hence nor the pollution emissions (dZ/dt 
= 0).  These new results give rise to a welfare 
consequence different from that in the earlier case.   
Using (1) and (21), the welfare effect under the tax credit 
system becomes: 
     (Eu - tEpu)du = t(Epp - Gpp)dt + [s - (EZ - tEpZ)]dZ + (t 
- tGpK)dK - tGpsds + Kdt.     (22) 
Comparing with (6) reveals that the last term on the right 
hand side of (22) is a new term, which shows that the 
home country now captures the shift of tax revenue.   
Since dK/dt = dZ/dt = 0 in the present case, the welfare 
effect of a capital tax for a given tariff rate (dt = 0) is: 
     (Eu - tEpu)(du/dt) = K > 0.       (23) 
This suggests that the host country in the presence of a 
foreign tax-credit system can raise the capital tax rate up 
to the foreign rate (t
*) without incurring allocative losses. 
 With a tax credit in place, the optimal tax rate for the 
home country, t
o, for 0 < t < t
* is therefore t
o = t
*.  
Combining the forgoing analysis about the three cases 
under tax credits, namely t < 0, t > t
* and 0 < t < t
*, we 
sketch a kinked optimal capital rate schedule as 
illustrated in Figure 2: when 0 < t < t
* under tax credits, 
the optimal tax schedule rotates to coincide with the 
horizontal line t
*, and when t < 0 and t > t
*, the optimal 
tax schedule follows through and coincides with the 
earlier schedule t
o derived in the absence of tax credits. 
          We turn to examine the jointly optimal tariff and 
capital tax rates in the presence of tax credits.  The 
jointly optimal rates depend upon the initial situation of 
the host economy.  If a capital tax used at the outset is t
oo 
(0 < t
oo < t
*) as shown in Figure 2.a, then the jointly 
optimal capital tax rate will be t
*.  That is, the host 
country would be better off by raising its tax rate up to t
* 
to capture the tax revenue from the source country.   
Substituting t
* into (15), we obtain the jointly optimal 
tariff rate: 
     t
o* = [(EZ - s)/A](dZ/dt) - t
*(dK/dt)/A.       (24) 
Comparing t
o* in (24) and t
oo in (17), we obtain 
     t
o* - t
oo = - [(dK/dt)/A](t
* - t
oo),                        (25) 
which is positive because dK/dt > 0 and A < 0.  With a 
foreign capital tax credit in place, the increase in the 
domestic capital tax rate to capture tax revenue leads to a 
higher tariff rate to attract tariff-jumping foreign capital. 
 The following proposition is immediate: 
 
 
Proposition 2:  For a small open two-sector economy 
with its importable sector using foreign capital and 
emitting pollution, its optimal capital tax and tariff rates 
increase as a result of the introduction of a tax credit 
system by the foreign country if 0 < t < t
* initially. 
     A more interesting case involves the use of a subsidy 
on foreign capital initially.  When t
oo < 0, multiple 
equilibria of jointly optimal policies may exist.   
Specifically, Figure 2.b shows the existence of two 
equilibria, as indicated by points N and C.  The first 
equilibrium N arises in the absence of the home country's 
response to tax credits available in the foreign country, 
and the second equilibrium C arises in the presence of 
the response to tax credits.  The welfare comparison of 
these two equilibria can be obtained by tracing the 
welfare changes associated with the movement from 
point N to T, and then with the movement from point T 
to C.  The former adjustment is welfare- worsening, 
whereas the latter shift is welfare-improving.  If the 
welfare effect from T to C dominates the welfare change 
from N to T, a tax on foreign capital together with a 
tariff, as denoted by C, becomes the jointly optimal 
policy; conversely, a subsidy on foreign capital  (jointly 
with an import subsidy) at point N remains the optimal 
policy.  The following proposition is immediate: 
 
 
Proposition 3:  When a subsidy to foreign capital is 
initially in place, the introduction of a tax credit in the 
foreign country may cause the host country to replace its 
capital subsidy with a tax policy.  The switch in policy 
also results in an increase of tariffs by the host country on 
the imports. 
    Using the above model, we can examine the impact of 
a pollution tax on the optimal tariffs under the tax credit 
system.  Differentiating (24), we obtain:  
    dt
o*/ds = - (dZ/dt)/A > 0. 
 
 (26) 
Proposition 4:  When a tax-credit system is in place in 
the source country, tightening environmental regulation 
via a rise in pollution tax leads to an increase in tariffs 
for a small open, capital-importing economy. 
     This result reinforces the earlier result in Proposition 
1 derived in the absence of tax credits.   
   
 
4.  Conclusion 
          This paper has examined the impacts of tightening 
the environmental regulations on optimal trade and 
investment policies.  We find that for a small open, 
capital-importing economy, a more stringent 
environmental measure leads to a higher optimal tariff 
and possibly a higher optimal tax on foreign capital.   
This result holds whether or not there is a capital tax 
credit system in the foreign source country.  We also 
found that when a tax credit is in place, multiple 
equilibria of optimal policies may exist if a subsidy in IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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lieu of a tax is provided to foreign capital.  Our results 
suggest that environmental protection can be 
incompatible with trade liberalization for a small, open 
economy with its importable sector relying on foreign 
capital. 
 
 
Footnotes 
1.  While our main objective in this paper is to study the 
effect of environmental policy on 
          optimal tariff, we will also touch upon the 
environmental policy impact on the optimal tax on 
     foreign  investment.    In  fact,  there  is  a  growing 
literature on the possible link between 
     environmental standards and foreign investment.  For 
example, Epping (1986) finds via a survey 
     that firms consider favorable pollution laws relevant 
when deciding where to invest.  Copeland 
     and Taylor (1997) find that capital mobility tends to 
cause world pollution to rise, as pollution 
     intensive  production  shifts  to  countries  with  lax 
environmental standards. 
2.  Pollution can be modelled as a by-product of the 
polluting industry (Copeland, 1994) or treated 
     as an input in the production process (Yu and Ingene, 
1982; Chao and Yu, 1997).  Here, Z is 
     a by-product of the polluting sector. 
3.  This is the so-called user-pay principle.  See Copeland 
(1994). 
4.  Environmentalists plead people to consume less of the 
goods that cause pollution in production. 
     Alternatively,  good  X2 and pollution can be 
substitutes, e.g., hiking shoes versus pollution. 
     If X2 and pollution are complements, then EpZ > 0, 
and the ensuing analysis would be 
     reinterpreted accordingly. 
5.  Eu - tEpu = Eu(1 - mt/p) > 0, where m = pEpu/Eu is 
defined as the marginal propensity to 
     consume good 2. 
6.  See Brecher and Diaz Alejandro (1977) and Beladi 
and Marjit (1992) on immiserizing capital 
     inflows.    As  for  earlier  studies  on  international 
investment and trade, see Kemp (1966), Jones 
     (1967) and Batra (1986). 
7.  This diagrammatic technique is adopted from Neary 
(1993). 
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Appendix 
     We compare the intercepts and slopes of the t
o and t
o 
schedules.  From (10) and (15), the difference of the 
intercepts is: 
     (dZ/dt)/(dK/dt)?t - (dZ/dt)/(dK/dt)?t = - GspGKK/GKp < 
0. 
The difference of the slopes is: 
     [GpK(dK/dt) - EpZ(dZ/dt)]/(dK/dt)?t - [GpK(dK/dt) - 
EpZ(dZ/dt) -(Epp - Rpp)]/(dK/dt)?t 
     =  {EpZ[(dZ/dt)(dK/dt) - (dZ/dt)(dK/dt)] + (Epp - 
Rpp)(dK/dt)}/(dK/dt)(dK/dt) 
     = EpZGspGKK/GKp - (Epp - Rpp)GKK/GKp < 0.     
 
 